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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
At issue in this appeal is physical custody of the twin daughters of the parties, appellant 
Zane Reed (Zane) and respondent Chelsea Sorensen, formerly known as Chelsea Reed (Chelsea). 
Zane and Chelsea are the parties of ten-year-old daughters. Under the terms of the parties' 2008 
divorce decree, the children resided primarily with Chelsea, with Zane receiving substantial 
visitation with the children. The children spent the majority of their life in Blackfoot, Idaho, 
surrounded by their parents and extended family. The dispute between the parties centers on 
Chelsea's unilateral decision to relocate the children to Havre, Montana for 2-3 years in pursuit 
of her husband's career opportunities, with an eventual plan to return to the Blackfoot area. 
Upon learning of Chelsea's intent to move the children to Havre, Montana, Zane filed 
with the magistrate court a motion for temporary orders, seeking to prohibit Chelsea from 
relocating the children to Montana, and a petition to modify child custody, in which Zane sought 
for a court order prohibiting Chelsea from relocating the children to Montana or, in the 
alternative, awarding Zane primary physical custody of the children. Chelsea countered with a 
motion for temporary orders, in which she sought an order permitting her to relocate the children 
to Montana. Upon the conclusion of the hearing on the motions for temporary orders, during 
which each party introduced evidence and testimony, Chelsea was permitted to relocate the 
children to Montana during the pendency of the custody modification proceedings. 
The parties presented evidence at a two-day trial on Zane's petition to modify the parties' 
divorce decree in December 2015. Following the conclusion of the trial, the magistrate court 
Appellant Brief 5 
issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which he ordered the children remain with 
Chelsea in Montana, with Zane entitled to visitation of at least once a month for three days, 
alternating holidays, and six weeks during the summer. Following receipt of the magistrate 
court's judgment, Zane moved for permission to appeal directly to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
which the magistrate court granted. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Zane filed his Verified Petition to Modify Divorce Decree and Motion for Temporary 
Order, together with a supporting affidavit, on August 4, 2015. (R Vol. I, pp. 2, 28-31.) Zane filed 
an Amended Petition to Modify Child Custody on August 10, 2015. (Id. at pp. 3, 32-36.) In 
response, Chelsea filed her Motion for Temporary Order, seeking an order permitting her to 
relocate with the children to Havre, Montana, together with a supporting affidavit, on August 31, 
2015. (Id. at p. 3.) A hearing on the parties' respective motions for temporary orders was held on 
September 30, 2015, after which Magistrate Judge James Barrett ruled that Chelsea could 
relocate the children to Havre, Montana, prior to the hearing on Zane's petition to modify the 
parties' divorce decree. (Id. at pp. 52-54.) 
The trial on Zane's petition to modify the parties' divorce decree commenced on 
December 10, 2015 and concluded on December 11, 2015 in Bingham County. During the course 
of the proceeding, Zane called two expert witnesses, Kirsten Griggs and Blake Gamer, both of 
whom testified in person in the courtroom as to the children's best interests vis-a-vis Chelsea's 
unilateral move to Havre, Montana. (See generally Tr Vol. I, pp. 58-116; Tr Vol. I, pp. 233-254.) 
Chelsea called one expert witness, Ellen Savage, electronically via Skype to address the best 
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interests of the children. (See generally id. at pp. 143-174, 182-205.) Each party called fact 
witnesses during its case in chief, and each party testified. 
On January 11, 2016, the magistrate court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. (R Vol. I, pp. 57-72.) The magistrate court determined that it was in the children's best 
interests to remain in Chelsea's primary physical custody, with Zane to receive visitation of three 
days each month, six weeks in the summer, and alternating holidays. (Id.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Zane and Chelsea were married on or about February 14, 2003 in Idaho Falls, Idaho. (R 
Vol. I, p. 11.) During their marriage, their daughters A.L.R. and A.R.R. were  on  
. (Id.) The parties divorced on February 29, 2008, with the parties sharing joint legal 
custody of the children, Chelsea receiving primary physical custody of the children, and Zane 
entitled to visitation on Saturdays and three evenings each month. (Id. at pp. 22-27.) In the years 
since entry of the divorce decree and prior to Zane filing his petition to modify the decree, the 
parties cooperated in informally adjusting the visitation schedule to better facilitate co-parenting 
of the children. (R Vol. I, p. 108, Hr'g Tr 49:25-51: 11.) For more than six years prior to Zane 
filing his petition to modify the parties' divorce decree, the children spent every other weekend 
with Zane. (Id.) Zane has also attended his children's school functions and athletic events. (R 
Vol. I, p. 107, Hr'g Tr 44:23-45: 19.) 
The children have spent the majority of their lives in Blackfoot, Idaho. (Id. at p. 117, 
Hr'g Tr 84:13-16.) The parties' parents the children's grandparents also live in Blackfoot, as 
well as other extended family members, including grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. (Tr 
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Vol. I, p. 46, L. 7-p. 48, L. 11; R Vol. I, p. 100, Hr'g Tr 18:12-18.) The children frequently 
spent time with these extended family members, including being babysat by Zane's parents on 
occasion, at both Zane's and Chelsea's request. (R Vol. I, p. 98, Hr'g Tr 9:12-25; id. at p. 141, 
Hr'g Tr 182:4-25.) In addition, Chelsea's father, the children's maternal grandfather, is the 
principal of the children's school, Snake River Middle School. (R Vol. I, p. 127, Hr'g Tr 126:25-
127 :9; Tr Vol. I, p. 301, L. 24 - p. 302, L. 6.) The children would see their grandfather every day 
at school. (Tr Vol. I, p. 317, L. 4-8.) The Snake River School District runs on a four-day school 
schedule, Monday through Thursday. (R Vol. I, p. 107, Hr'g Tr 46:18-47:5.) 
After the parties' divorce, each party subsequently became involved in serious 
relationships that produced children. Zane married Brooke Casto in August 2010. (Tr Vol. I, p. 
258, L. 12-17.) During their marriage, Zane and Brooke had a daughter. (Tr Vol. I, p. 263, L. 8-
13.) In addition, Zane served as a father to Brooke's daughter from a previous relationship. (Tr 
Vol. I, p. 265, L. 17-20.) Zane and Brooke divorced in August 2014, but Zane continues to have a 
relationship with both his daughter with Brooke and Brooke's daughter from a previous 
relationship. (Tr Vol. I, p. 258, L. 17; R Vol. I, p. 112, 66:10-67:16.) At Brooke's request, Zane 
will watch these girls at her home when she is away. (Tr Vol. I, p. 292, L. 11 -p. 293, L. 17.) 
According to Brooke, a witness called by Chelsea during her case-in-chief, Zane is a "good dad" 
and a "wonderful father." (Tr Vol. I, p. 263, L. 8-1 O; id. at p. 286, L. 8 - p. 287, L. 11.) After his 
divorce from Brooke, Zane began dating Kate Nice. (R Vol. I, p. 116, Hr'g Tr 82:11-24.) Kate 
lives in Boise with her children from a previous relationship. (Id. at pp. 115-16, Hr'g Tr 79:15-
18, 80:11-18.) 
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After her divorce from Zane, Chelsea married Daniel Sorensen in August 2009. (Id at p. 
117, Hr'g Tr 84:17-22.) Chelsea and Daniel have two sons together. (Id. at p. 117, Hr'g Tr 84:23-
84:4.) Daniel graduated from Idaho State University in August 2015 with a physician's assistant 
degree. (Id at pp. 128-29, Hr'g Tr 131 :22-132:4.) Daniel received a physician's assistant job 
offer from Northern Montana Hospital in Havre, Montana, after his graduation from Idaho State 
University. (Id at p. 128, Hr'g Tr 131: 10-21.) The job offer from Northern Montana Hospital 
included significant incentives such as student loan repayment. (Id at p. 131, Hr'g Tr 140:14-
141 :23.) Daniel also received a physician's assistant job offer from Medicine Bow, Wyoming, 
but declined to take the position. (Id at p. 130, Hr'g Tr 138:18-139:1.) Chelsea and Daniel both 
testified they plan to return to the Blackfoot area in two to three years when Daniel can obtain 
employment as a physician's assistant in the area. (Id at p. 133, Hr'g Tr 150:22-24; id at p. 121, 
Hr'g Tr 101:7-18.) 
Prior to her move to Havre, Montana, Chelsea was employed as a school teacher. (Id at 
p. 127, Hr'g Tr 124:16-125:6.) Upon Daniel Sorensen's graduation from Idaho State University 
with his physician's assistant degree, Chelsea resigned her position to instead stay home with her 
children. (Id) 
Zane is a project supervisor with Concrete Placing, charged with overseeing and 
administering construction projects. (Id at p. 104, Hr'g Tr 32:12-15.) Though Zane travels on 
occasion for work, he resides at a house in Blackfoot he rents from his grandfather. (Id at pp. 
111-12, Hr'g Tr 63:4-14, 64:11-65:4.) Zane's mother testified that she and her husband can 
continue to help with any child care needs that might arise, should the children reside in 
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Blackfoot. (Id. at 141, Hr'g Tr 182:4-25.) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the magistrate court's findings were based on the substantial and 
competent expert witness testimony. 
B. vVhether the magistrate court abused its discretion in permitting Cheisea's 
expert witness to testify via Skype. 
C. Whether the magistrate court abused its discretion in allowing Ms. Savage's 
testimony. 
D. Whether the magistrate court abused its discretion in determining it was in the 
children's best interests to relocate to Havre, Montana. 
E. Whether the magistrate court abused its discretion in improperly considering 
the tender years doctrine in issuing its decision. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Zane claims his attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, Idaho Code§ 12-120, and Idaho Code § 12-121. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
Idaho appellate courts review a magistrate court's child custody determination under an 
abuse of discretion standard. Schneider v. Schneider, 151 Idaho 415,420,258 P.3d 350,355 
(2011) (citing Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448,454, 80 P.3d 1049, 1055 (2003)). Under 
an abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court engages in the following analysis: 
[T]he Court asks first whether the magistrate court correctly perceived the 
custody issue as one of discretion; then whether the magistrate court acted within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to the court; and finally, whether the 
magistrate court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
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Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278,282,281 P.3d 115, 119 (2012) (citing Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 
859, 861-62, 187 P.3d 1234, 1236-37 (2008)). A magistrate court abused its discretion if its 
"findings are clearly erroneous such that the court's findings are not based on substantial and 
competent evidence." Schneider, 151 Idaho at 420,258 P.3d at 355. In child custody 
modification proceedings, '"[a]n abuse of discretion occurs when the evidence is insufficient to 
support a magistrate's conclusion that the interests and welfare of the children would be best 
served' by the magistrate court's determination." Clair, 153 Idaho at 282, 281 P.3d at 119 ( citing 
Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 713, 170 P.3d 375,378 (2007)). 
In ruling on evidentiary issues in child custody modification proceedings, a magistrate 
court "has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and to determine whether a witness is 
qualified as an expert." Clair, 153 Idaho at 283,281 P.3d at 120 (citing State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 
520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003)). A magistrate court's ruling on the introduction of evidence 
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Clair, 153 Idaho at 282-83, 281 P.3d at 119-
120 (citing Perry, 139 Idaho at 521, 81 P.3d at 1231). A magistrate abuses its discretion in 
admitting or excluding evidence if such a ruling is a "manifest abuse of the [magistrate] court's 
discretion and a substantial right of the party is affected." Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 
127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995). 
B. The magistrate court's findings were not based on the substantial and competent 
expert witness testimony. 
The magistrate court abused its discretion in failing to consider the substantial and 
competent expert witness testimony offered at trial. Despite the hours of testimony provided by 
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expert witnesses, the magistrate court failed to evaluate or even address the expert 
recommendations in its findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. (See generally R Vol. I, pp. 57-
72. 
A magistrate court has the discretion to determine the admissibility of expert witness 
testimony. Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278,290,281 P.3d 115, 127 (citing Jones v. Crawforth, 147 
Idaho 11, 21,205 P.3d 660,670 (2009)). A magistrate court is not limited to considering only 
those custody arrangements advocated by expert witnesses at trial, but may instead act within its 
discretion to craft a custody arrangement that is in the best interests of the children. Milliron v. 
Milliron, 116 Idaho 253,255, 775 P.2d 145, 147 (Ct. App. 1989). However, a magistrate court 
abuses its discretion if its findings are "not based on substantial and competent evidence" or 
"when the evidence is insufficient to support a magistrate's conclusion that the interests and 
welfare of the children would be best served by the magistrate court's order." Clair, 153 Idaho at 
282, 281 P .3d at 119 (internal citations omitted). 
Zane's expert witnesses, Kirsten Griggs and Blair Garner, testified extensively regarding 
their recommendations for primary custody of the children to remain in Blackfoot. (See generally 
Tr Vol. I. pp. 58-117, 233-257.) In addition, Chelsea's expert, Ellen Savage, provided testimony 
via Skype regarding her recommendations for primary custody of the children to remain with 
Chelsea in Montana. (See generally id. at pp. 143-211.) For the reasons set forth below, the 
magistrate court abused its discretion by first allowing Ms. Savage to testify via Skype and then 
denying the motion to strike her testimony. See infra. However, the magistrate court made no 
mention of Ms. Savage's testimony, including its evidentiary shortcomings, in its findings of fact 
Appellant Brief 12 
and conclusions oflaw. Likewise, the magistrate court made no mention, for good or ill, 
regarding Ms. Griggs' and Mr. Garner's testimonies. 
The substantial and competent expert witness testimony offered at trial by Ms. Griggs 
and Mr. Garner supported a custody arrangement that would see the children remaining in 
Blackfoot, rather than relocating to Havre, Montana. (Tr Vol. I, p. 71, L. 25 - p. 72, L. 15; id. at 
p. 99, L. 24 p. 100, L. 19.) Ms. Griggs and Mr. Garner each spoke at length regarding their 
respective thoughts as to the children's best interests. (Jd.) Likewise, Ms. Griggs and Mr. Garner 
spoke to the detrimental effects the children would experience through excessive travel between 
Blackfoot and Havre, as well as the stresses inherent in a future return move to Blackfoot. (Tr 
Vol. I, p. 68, L. 25 - p. 69, L. 24; id. at p. 252, L. 23 - p. 253, L. 14; id. at p. 70, L. 4-24; id. at p. 
240, L. 10- p. 241, L. 13.) 
The extensive testimony from Zane's expert witnesses called for primary physical 
custody of the children to remain in Blackfoot. Contrary to this testimony, the magistrate court 
determined it was in the children's best interests to relocate with Chelsea to Havre, Montana. In 
making this determination, the magistrate court did not address the detrimental effects the 
children would experience in traveling from Havre to Blackfoot for visitation with Zane. (See 
generally R Vol. I, pp. 57-72.) The magistrate court also failed to address the impact of Chelsea's 
planned move back to Blackfoot in 2-3 years, when the children are entering adolescence. (Id.) 
The magistrate court ignored these key issues in its order on child custody, without any reference 
to the applicable expert witness testimony. 
Though the magistrate court was empowered to order a custody arrangement different 
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from that articulated by Ms. Griggs and Mr. Gamer, the magistrate court's utter failure to 
distinguish Zane's expert witness testimony, including why it found such testimony to be 
inconclusive in determining the best interests of the children, was an abuse of discretion. The 
magistrate court offered no explanation of whether it considered or disregarded the expert 
witness testimony in drafting its custody order, rendering it impossible to determine if the 
evidence is sufficient to support the magistrate court's conclusion that the best interests of the 
children called for relocation to Havre, Montana. The magistrate court abused its discretion in 
failing to address the weight of expert witness testimony in its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
C. The magistrate court abused its discretion in permitting Chelsea's expert 
witness to testify via Skype. 
The magistrate court abused its discretion in permitting Chelsea's expert witness to 
testify via Skype during the trial on Zane's petition to modify the parties' divorce decree. Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 43 requires, 
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless 
otherwise provided by statute or by these rules, the Idaho Rules of Evidence, or 
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Idaho. 
IDAHO R. C1v. P. 43 (2016) (emphasis added). 1 Under the purview of Rule 43 as presently 
constituted, a witness must testify in open court unless otherwise allowed under another Idaho 
court rule. An Alabama appellate court, in interpreting similar language in Rule 43 of the 
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, noted the following: 
1 The cited text to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 43 is effective until July 1, 2016. The revised text of Rule 43, 
effective as of July 1, 2016, is addressed, infra. 
Appellant Brief 14 
Rule 43(a) states that witness testimony is to be taken "in open court." "Open 
court" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary 1123 (8th ed. 2004), as "[a] court 
that is in session, presided over by a judge, attended by the parties and their 
attorneys, and engaged in judicial business. Furthermore, the Committee 
Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 43(a) state: 
"Rule 43(a) will make oral testimony before the court in an equity 
proceeding the rule, rather than the exception. This desirable change gives the 
trial court the obvious advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses so as to 
determine more readily their veracity ( or lack thereof) and the weight to be given 
their testimony." 
Greener v. Killough, 1 So.3d 93, 102 (Ala.Civ.App. 2008). The Greener court concluded that, 
based on the plain language of Rule 43, the probate court abused its discretion by allowing a 
physician to testify by telephone. Id. at 103. Because the physician's testimony was inadmissible 
under Rule 43, the probate court committed reversible error in allowing the testimony. Id. 
Under the current language ofldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 43, the requirement that a 
witness testify in open court can be overcome if otherwise authorized elsewhere in the Idaho 
court rules. IDAHO R. Civ. P. 43 (2016). In permitting Chelsea's expert witness, Ellen Savage, to 
testify over Skype, the magistrate court cited Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 501. (Trial 
Tr. 10:7-11:2.) Specifically, the magistrate court noted that Rule 501(d) made such testimony 
"allowable." (Id., 10:23-25.) Rule 501 of the family law procedural rules addresses motion 
practice, providing in part: 
D. Hearings by telephone conference or video teleconference. The court may 
hold a telephone conference or video hearing on, ( 1) any motion, other than 
motions for summary judgment unless the parties stipulate or (2) any pretrial 
matter. 
IDAHO R. FAMILY LAW P. 50l(d) (2016). 
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Rule 501 does not speak to permitting an expert witness to testify via Skype at a trial on a 
petition to modify child custody. Instead, Rule 50I(d) only permits courts to conduct conferences 
or hearings and pretrial conferences via telephone or video conferencing. Notably, Rule 501 ( d) 
does not permit a court to conduct a hearing on a motion for summary judgment via telephone or 
videoconferencing unless the parties stipulate. Given Rule 50I(d)'s inherent limitations, 
including its narrow scope in addressing telephone and videoconference appearances in motion 
practice, Rule 501 ( d) does not permit a magistrate judge to allow a witness to testify at trial via 
Skype. 
Had the drafters of the family law procedural rules intended to empower courts to allow 
witness testimony via teleconference or videoconference, such a rule would be included in Rule 
701 et seq. of the family law procedural rules, those addressing pretrial and trial procedure. 
However, instead of language authorizing teleconference or videoconference testimony at trial, 
Rule 712 of the family law procedural rules instead reiterates Rule 43 of the civil procedural 
rules: 
A. Taking of testimony. In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken 
orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by statute or by these rules, the 
Idaho Rules of Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court ofldaho. 
IDAHO R. FAMILY LAW P. 712 (2016). The drafters of the family law procedural rules declined to 
extend Rule 501 's permitted teleconferencing and videoconferencing to Rule 712 's rules for 
taking testimony at trial. The magistrate court's determination that Rule 50I(d) rendered Ms. 
Savage's testimony via Skype "allowable" during the trial on Zane's petition to modify the 
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parties' divorce decree was an abuse of discretion and contrary to the limitations of both Rules 
501 and 712. 
The magistrate also abused his discretion in permitting Ms. Savage to testify under the 
text ofldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 43, effective as of July 1, 2016: 
(a) In Open Court. At trial, the witnesses' testimony must be taken in open court 
unless a statute, these rules, the Idaho Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by 
the Idaho Supreme Court provide otherwise. For good cause in compelling 
circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, the court may permit testimony 
in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location. 
IDAHO R. C1v. P. 43 ( effective date July 1, 2016) ( emphasis added). The change to Rule 43 of 
Idaho's civil procedural rules aligns with a 1996 revision to Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which now permits a court to allow testimony by contemporaneous transmission from 
a different location in light of compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 43 (2016).2 
The Seventh Circuit recently examined the sufficiency of testimony via 
videoconferencing technology in Perotti v. Quinones, 790 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2015). In Perotti, 
an inmate appealed a district court's decision denying the inmate's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus ad testificandum and arranging instead for the inmate to participate via videoconference 
in proceedings on his retaliation claims against prison instructors and administrators. Id. at 713-
14. In reviewing the inmate's writ, the district court determined that because the inmate, who had 
been classified as extremely dangerous, was asking the government to bear the cost of his 
2 Notably, Rule 712 of the family law procedural rules will not be changed under the 2016 amendments to Idaho 
court rules to adapt the new language of Rule 43. 
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transport from New Jersey to Indiana, and because the inmate was not scheduled to be released 
from prison until at least 2019, having the inmate appear by video was a realistic alternative. Id. 
at 715. At trial, the "video feed from Perotti's place of incarceration was displayed on a 42-inch 
monitor in the courtroom, the size of which permitted everyone in the court, including the jury, 
to see his facial expressions. With the exception of a brief interruption in the feed ... there is no 
indication that anyone in the courtroom had any difficulty seeing, hearing, or understanding 
Perotti." Id. at 716. 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision denying the inmate's writ, 
quoting applicable language from the advisory committee to the 1996 amendment to Federal 
Rule 43: 
The importance of presenting live testimony in court cannot be forgotten. The 
very ceremony of trial and the presence of the factfinder may exert a powerful 
force for truthtelling. The opportunity to judge the demeanor of a witness face-to-
face is accorded great value in our tradition. Transmission cannot be justified 
merely by showing that it is inconvenient for the witness to attend trial. 
Id. at 723 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 43 advisory committee note (1996 amendment)). 
The Perotti court continued: 
Videoconference proceedings have their shortcomings. "[V]irtual reality is rarely 
a substitute for actual presence and ... even in an age of advancing technology, 
watching an event on the screen remains less than the complete equivalent of 
actually attending it." United States v. Lawrence, 248 F .3d 300, 304 ( 4th Cir. 
2001 ). "The immediacy of a living person is lost" with video technology. Stoner 
v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209,213 (6th Cir. 1993). As the court in Edwards v. Logan, 
38 F.Supp.2d 463 (W.D.Va 1999), observed, "Video conferencing ... is not the 
same as actual presence, and it is to be expected that the ability to observe 
demeanor, central to the fact-finding process, may be lessened in a particular case 
by video conferencing. This may be particularly detrimental where it is a party to 
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the case who is participating by video conferencing, since personal impression 
may be a crucial factor in persuasion." 38 F.Supp.2d at 467. 
Perotti at 723-24 ( quoting Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
Under the new Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 43, effectively July 1, 2016, and the Perotti 
analysis under Federal Rule 43, there were no compelling circumstances justifying Ms. Savage's 
testimony over Skype. Ms. Savage was in Chinook, Montana, rather than across or out of the 
country.3 (Tr Vol. I, p. 141, L. 12-13.) Ms. Savage was not suffering from an unexpected or 
sudden illness or tragedy that otherwise hindered her ability to travel; instead, Chelsea's counsel 
moved the magistrate court for permission for Ms. Savage to appear via Skype well in advance 
of the December trial date. (R Vol. I, p. 55-56.) Had Ms. Savage been absolutely unable to testify 
in person at the trial in December, Chelsea's counsel could have arranged for Ms. Savage to be 
deposed. Simply put, there were other options available to Chelsea's counsel for including Ms. 
Savage's testimony into the record within the purview of Rule 43 of the civil procedural rules 
and Rule 712 of the family law procedural rules, and any inconvenience to Ms. Savage was not 
sufficient justification to permit her testimony via Skype. 
Despite objections from Zane's counsel, the magistrate court permitted Ms. Savage to 
testify via Skype from her location in Chinook, Montana. (Tr Vol. I, pp. 10-11; id. at pp. 142-
143.) As shown by the trial transcript, the "appropriate safeguards" contemplated by the new 
3 Any inconvenience endured by Ms. Savage in traveling from Chinook, Montana to Blackfoot 
for the trial underscores the distance between Zane in Blackfoot and the children in Havre, 
Montana and the onerous travel burden on the children under the magistrate court's order. 
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Rule 43 were not present during Ms. Savage's testimony. During Ms. Savage's testimony, there 
were problems with the video delay. 
THE COURT: And there is some - there is a problem with the delay and stuff; so 
sometimes I'm not even hearing the question and answer before I get an 
objection. And that is part of the technology. 
(Tr Vol. I, p. 153, L. 8-11.) At other times during Ms. Savage's testimony, the video went black. 
(Id. at p.182, L. 15 - p. 183, L. 22.) Ms. Savage's words during her testimony were frequently 
unintelligible over the Skype call. (See generally Tr Vol. I, p. 141, L. 1 - p. 174, L. 12; id. at p. 
182, L. 1 - p. 206, L. 19.) Zane's counsel expressed his frustration with trying to cross-examine 
Ms. Savage over the poor Skype connection: 
THE COURT: 
MR. BRUNSON: 
THE COURT: 
MR. BRUNSON: 
THE COURT: 
MR. BRUNSON: 
THE COURT: 
MR. BRUNSON: 
THE COURT: 
MR. BRUNSON: 
THE COURT: 
MR. BRUNSON: 
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Just wait for her answers. 
I'm - okay. 
You're not waiting for my answers, even. Can you do it? 
I'm trying, Your Honor. 
Well, do it. 
Okay. 
That's the order. 
Okay. It's just - it's hard for me to do that with the video. 
Well, take a breath. 
I'm-I'm-
Wait for her answers. 
I'm trying. I'm struggling. 
THE COURT: She will answer. I think she can answer, and you can get 
your questions in. I know this technology is difficult, and it's harder when they're 
over the Internet like this. But just let her answer, please. 
(Tr Vol. I, p. 196, L. 18 -p. 197, L. 11.) 
There were no compelling circumstances to justify Ms. Savage's testimony via Skype, 
rather than in person in the courtroom. Further, even had there been compelling circumstances to 
justify Ms. Savage's testimony via Skype, there were not appropriate safeguards in place to 
ensure her testimony came through in a clear and coherent manner. Permitting Ms. Savage's 
testimony via Skype introduced uncertainty into the proceedings and prejudiced Zane in his 
ability to effectively cross-examine Ms. Savage. 
Under any iteration of Rule 43, the magistrate court abused its discretion in permitting 
Ms. Savage to testify via Skype at trial, rather than require Ms. Savage to testify in person in the 
courtroom pursuant to Rule 43 and Rule 712 of the family law procedural rules. 
D. The magistrate court abused its discretion in allowing Ms. Savage's testimony. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, which governs testimony by expert witnesses, states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
IDAHO R. Evrn. 702 (2016). 
"A qualified expert is one who possesses 'knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education.' Formal training is not necessary, but practical experience or special 
knowledge must be shown to bring a witness within the category of an expert. 
The proponent of the testimony must lay foundational evidence showing that the 
individual is qualified as an expert on the topic of his or her testimony." 
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Clair, 153 Idaho at 287,281 P.3d at 124 (quoting Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 
834, 837, 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007). 
Though a magistrate court has "broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and to 
determine whether a witness is qualified as an expert," "'an abuse of discretion occurs when the 
evidence is insufficient to support a magistrate's conclusion that the interests and welfare of the 
children would be best served by the magistrate court's order."' Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278, 
282-83, 281 P.3d 115, 119-120 (2012) (internal citations omitted). The magistrate court abused 
its discretion in allowing testimony proffered by Chelsea's expert witness. 
1. Chelsea's expert lacked understanding of Idaho custodial law. 
Rule 702 requires that an expert witness have scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge that assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in 
issue. IDAHO R. Evm. 702 (2016). As revealed during Zane's cross-examination of Ms. Savage at 
trial, Ms. Savage was unfamiliar with Idaho custodial standards (as well as the children's 
environment in Blackfoot, Idaho, infra): 
Q. Yeah. You are not familiar with the standard used to determine custody in 
Idaho? 
A. Correct. I am not. 
Q. You've never been an expert witness in Idaho before; correct? 
A. That is correct. 
(Tr Vol. I, p. 188, L. 25 -p. 189, L. 5.) In later testimony, Ms. Savage again demonstrated her 
unfamiliarity with Idaho custodial standards, specifically "Idaho's presumption that it is in the 
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child's best interest to maintain frequent and continuing contact with both parents, unless one 
parent is an habitual perpetrator of domestic violence," Bartosz v. Jones. 146 Idaho 449,454, 
197 P.3d 310,315 (2008) (citing IDAHO CODE§ 32-7178 (2008)): 
Q. And would you agree with me that it is very important that Dad - and, in 
this case, that would be Zane Reed - have frequent and continuing contacts with 
his daughters? 
A. I would need to discuss the definition of "frequent." 
(Tr Vol. I, p. 190, L. 5-10.) 
Q. And you agree with me that the biological it's important for the girls to 
have continuing contacts and frequent contacts with the biological parents; 
correct? 
A. Again, frequent is negotiable, but yes. Consistent. 
(Id. atp.194, L. 1-6.) 
Upon the conclusion of Ms. Savage's testimony, Zane's counsel moved to strike her 
testimony in its entirety. (Id. at p. 208, L. 8-16.) The magistrate court denied the motion to strike 
Ms. Savage's testimony. (Id. at p. 209, L. 15-23.) In so doing, the magistrate court abused its 
discretion by including Ms. Savage's testimony in the record and possibly considering it for 
purposes of determining custody of the children.4 
Ms. Savage, by her own admission, was unfamiliar with Idaho custodial standards, 
including the presumption that it is in a child's best interests to have frequent, continuing contact 
with both parents, provided domestic violence is not an issue. Without this basic understanding 
4 As noted above, supra, because the magistrate court failed to address any expert witness 
testimony in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, including whether it accepted or 
disregarded expert witness recommendations, there is uncertainty as to the extent to which the 
magistrate court considered Ms. Savage's testimony in drafting its decision. 
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of Idaho custodial standards, Ms. Savage was not qualified to recommend a custodial 
arrangement to the magistrate court. Ms. Savage's acknowledged unfamiliarity with Idaho 
custodial standards rendered her testimony unhelpful to the magistrate court in determining what 
was in the best interest of the children pursuant to Idaho law, contrary to the requirements of 
evidentiary rule 702. Because Ms. Savage was not qualified to testify as an expert witness, the 
magistrate's failure to strike her testimony in full was an abuse of discretion. 
2. Chelsea's expert's failed to evaluate the children's Idaho environment. 
Not only did Ms. Savage acknowledge her unfamiliarity with Idaho custodial standards, 
she also admitted her unfamiliarity with the children's environment in Blackfoot, Idaho: 
Q. And you've never been to Blackfoot, Idaho? 
A. I've actually driven through there. 
Q. Okay. But-you've driven through there one time. Was that- when was 
that? 
A. It was years ago. But, no, I have not spent time there. 
Q. And you have not observed the two girls that we're talking about today in 
that environment, have you? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You have not visited with any of their extended family, have you? 
A. I have not. 
Q. And you really don't even know what the extended family situation is in 
Blackfoot, Idaho, do you? 
A. Only of hearsay. 
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(Tr Vol. I, p. 189, L. 6-21.) In her evaluation of the children's situation, Ms. Savage did not 
investigate the children's environment in Idaho; instead, Ms. Savage focused the entirety of her 
evaluation, and her subsequent custodial recommendation, on her 45-minute interview with the 
children at her office, and a follow-up interview with Chelsea and Daniel Sorensen. (Tr Vol. I, p. 
192, L. 6-11; id. atp. 192, L. 18-p. 193, L. 6.) 
Ms. Savage's evaluation of the children failed to address other factors articulated in Idaho 
Code§ 32-717, including without limitation Zane's wishes; the children's interactions with 
Zane's other children; the children's familiarity and adjustment with their school and community 
in Blackfoot; and the need to promote continuity and stability in the children's lives. See IDAHO 
CODE § 32-717 (2016). In fact, Ms. Savage testified that her view of the children's best interests 
excluded these additional factors: 
Q. And what about- what about a family unit? Does if the girls were here 
and awarded custody to Zane, is that a family unit in comparison? How can you 
compare those two family units to what they have in Montana? 
A. It - from the perspective of what is best for the girls, it has nothing to do 
with whether they're in Montana or Florida or Egypt. It has to do with the fact 
that they are maintaining their residence with the primary - with their mother and 
the primary source of their nurturing since birth. 
Q. So the relevant factor that you're talking about is that the situation that 
they've been in since birth is where they should stay? 
A. Correct. 
(Tr Vol. I, p. 185, L. 1-15.) 
Appellant Brief 25 
Ms. Savage likewise failed to consider other factors unique to this case, including 
Chelsea's plan to move back to the Blackfoot area, and its potential negative effects on the 
children: 
Q. So were you aware that the testimony in this case is that Morn and Stepdad 
intend on coming back to Blackfoot, Idaho? 
A. Yes. I understand that that is one possibility. 
Q. And that's something they told you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you would agree that moving has impact on these girls; correct? 
A. Positive and negative, yes. "Impact" is a - it's a nebulous term. So, of 
course, it has impact. It can be positive; it can be negative. 
Q. And certainly can have long-term, lasting negative impact; correct? 
A. Not nee [sic] - I don't understand- I don't know. 
Q. You don't know? Is that your answer? 
A. Correct. 
(Id. at p. 199, L. 25 - p. 200, L. 18.) 
By her own admission, Ms. Savage could not speak to the negative impact a future move 
back to Blackfoot would have on the children. Ms. Savage's failure to evaluate the children's 
environment in Blackfoot rendered her opinion irrelevant and unhelpful to the magistrate court 
for purposes of determining whether it was in the best interests of the children to remain in 
Blackfoot or to relocate to Havre, Montana. Ms. Savage's testimony regarding the children's 
situation in Havre was essentially putting the cart before the horse, or shifting the burden to Zane 
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to show it was in the best interests of the children to return and remain in Blackfoot, Idaho. 
Chelsea, as the relocating parent, has the burden of proving that relocation to Havre is in the best 
interests of the children. Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449,457, 197 P.3d 310,318 (2008) (citing 
Roberts v. Roberts, 138 Idaho 401,405, 64 P.3d 321,331 (2003). Ms. Savage's testimony 
regarding the children's adjustment to Havre, after the fact, was not informative to the issue 
before the magistrate court. 
Because Ms. Savage lacked both familiarity with Idaho custodial standards, as well as 
knowledge and understanding of the children's Blackfoot environment, the magistrate court 
abused its discretion in denying Zane's counsel's motion to strike Ms. Savage's testimony. 
E. The magistrate court abused its discretion in determining it was in the 
children's best interest to relocate to Havre, Montana. 
"For determinations of custody, a magistrate court is required to base its decision on the 
best interests of the child." Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278,283,281 P.3d 115, 120 (2012). The 
best interests of a child are of "paramount importance" in child custody proceedings. Schultz v. 
Schultz, 145 Idaho 859,862, 187 P.3d 1234, 1237 (2008). "Under Idaho law, unless one parent is 
a habitual perpetrator of domestic violence, it is presumed that an award of joint custody serves a 
child's best interest." Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449, 456, 197 P.3d 310, 317 (2008); see also 
IDAHO CODE § 32-717B (2016). "An award of joint physical custody must assure that the child 
has 'frequent and continuing contact with both parents,' but this 'does not necessarily mean the 
child's time with each parent should be exactly the same in length nor does it necessarily mean 
the child should be alternating back and forth over certain periods of time between each parent."' 
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Bartosz, 146 Idaho at 456, 197 P.3d at 317 ( quoting IDAHO CODE § 32-7178 (2016) ). 
Idaho Code § 32-717 sets out a list of non-exhaustive relevant factors a magistrate court 
may consider in determining custody. IDAHO CODE§ 32-717 (2016); Clair, 153 Idaho at 283, 
281 P.3d at 120. These factors include the parents' wishes; the child's wishes; the child's 
relationship to his or her parents and siblings; the child's adjustment to his or her home, school, 
and community; the character and circumstances of those involved; and the need to promote 
continuity and stability in the child's life. IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (2016). Magistrate courts are 
"free to consider other factors that may be relevant." Bartosz, 146 Idaho at 454, 197 P.3d at 315; 
see also IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (2016). 
When a parent decides unilaterally to move out of state with a child, "the relocating 
parent can be awarded physical custody only where he or she proves by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the move is in the child's best interests." Clair, 153 Idaho at 285, 281 P.3d at 122 
(citing Danti v. Danti, 146 Idaho 929,935,204 P.3d 1140, 1146 (2009)). 
Further, because of the presumption reflected in LC. § 32-7178 favoring the 
active participation of both parents, "it is presumed that it is not in the child's best 
interests to permit one parent to unilaterally remove a child from the community 
where the parents and child resided when such move prevents the other parent 
from having frequent and continuing contact with the child." 
Clair, 153 Idaho at 285,281 P.3d at 122 (quoting Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882,889, 173 
P.3d 1141, 1148 (2007) (Eismann, CJ., specially concurring)). 
1. Chelsea did not meet her burden in proving relocation was in the best 
interests of the children. 
Because Chelsea unilaterally decided to move the children in Havre, Montana, she had 
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the burden to prove to the magistrate court by a preponderance of the evidence that such a move 
was in the best interests of the children. Because the weight of the evidence indicated it was in 
the children's best interest to remain in Blackfoot, Chelsea did not meet her burden, and the 
magistrate court abused its discretion in determining the children should be permitted to remain 
in Havre, Montana with Chelsea. 
In Clair v. Clair, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed a magistrate court's custody decision 
regarding a similar relocation situation. 153 Idaho 278,281 P.3d 115 (2012). In Clair, a mother 
appealed after a magistrate court determined it was in the subject child's best interests to 
continue to reside in the Pocatello area, rather than relocate with his mother to Nevada. Id., 153 
Idaho at 283-84, 281 P.3d at 120-121. In determining custody of the child, the magistrate court 
determined "it was the court's responsibility, not the parents, to examine where [the child] should 
live in the future." Id., 153 Idaho at 283,281 P.3d at 120. The magistrate court analyzed the 
factors set forth in Idaho Code§ 32-717: 
The magistrate court concluded that the interrelationship between the child and 
parents, and the child's adjustment to home, school, and community favored 
shared custody in Idaho because a move to Reno with Tracy would not have a 
positive effect on [the child's] relationship with Charles. Also, the magistrate 
court reasoned that the proposed move from Ely to Reno by Tracy would be to a 
community unknown to [the child], whereas, [the child] had spent most of his life 
in Pocatello, and was already familiar with Charles' new home and the child care 
providers in Pocatello. [The child] would be unfamiliar with the surroundings if 
Tracy moved to Reno. The conclusions for the promotion of continuity and 
stability in [the child's] life also focused on Tracy relocating to Reno. The 
magistrate court reasoned that custody in Pocatello would promote more 
continuity and stability in [the child's] life because of familiarity with the area - a 
"stable known environment." 
Id, 153 Idaho at 283-84, 281 P.3d at 120-21. 
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The magistrate court determined that both parties were loving parents to the child, and 
"that the analysis of the best interests of the child indicated the ideal arrangement would be 
living in Pocatello with both parents nearby to share an overnight custody rotation." Id., 153 
Idaho at 284,281 P.3d at 121. To facilitate this determination, the magistrate court crafted 
alternative custody arrangements, all of which had the child residing in Pocatello. Id. The Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court's decision, finding that the alternative custodial 
arrangements crafted by the magistrate court were within the magistrate court's discretion and 
consistent with applicable legal standards. Id. 
Like the mother in Clair, Chelsea failed to meet her burden to show that her proposed 
relocation of the children in Havre, Montana, was in their best interest. "Under Idaho law, it is 
presumed that a continuing relationship with both parents is in the child's best interest." Id., 153 
Idaho at 284,281 P.3d at 121 (quoting Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, 865, 187 P.3d 1234, 
1240 (2008)); see also IDAHO CODE § 32-717B (2016) ("Joint physical custody shall be shared 
by the parents in such a way to assure the child a frequent and continuing contact with both 
parents ... "). Prior to Chelsea's unilateral move to Havre, Montana, Zane spent every other 
weekend with the children. (R Vol. I, p. 108, Hr'g Tr 49:25-51: 11.) In addition, Zane attended 
the children's school programs and athletic events. (Id at p. 107, Hr'g Tr 44:23-45:19.) Under 
the visitation schedule adopted by the magistrate court in its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, Zane's visitation was reduced to three-day visits each month, alternating holidays, and six 
weeks' visitation during the summer months. (Id at pp. 69-70.) These visits between Zane and 
the children require the children to travel roundtrip for fifteen hours. (Id.) The evidence at trial 
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did not support the change from Zane's frequent and continuous contact with the children to the 
visitation plan determined by the magistrate judge. 
Chelsea failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that relocation to Havre, 
Montana, was in the children's best interests. Instead, analysis of the factors articulated in Idaho 
Code § 32-717 indicate it is in the children's best interests to remain in Blackfoot. 
Parents' Wishes. As was the case in Clair, and undoubtedly the case in the vast majority 
of child custody proceedings, each parent expressed contrary desires for custody, with Chelsea 
asking to retain primary physical custody of the children in Havre, Montana, and Zane seeking 
for the girls to reside in Blackfoot, with either Chelsea retaining primary physical custody, or 
with primary physical custody being transferred to Zane. (R Vol. I, p. 121, Hr'g Tr 100:18-101:6; 
Tr Vol. I, p. 125, L. 8-19.) The parents' competing wishes as to custody do not satisfy Chelsea's 
burden to show relocation is in the children's best interests. 
Children s Wishes. Evidence regarding the children's wishes as to custody was not 
supportive of Chelsea's desire to relocate the children to Montana. The magistrate court met with 
the children in chambers, without counsel, prior to the temporary orders hearing. (R Vol. I, p. 97, 
Hr'g Tr 4:10-5:4.) After talking to the children, the magistrate court determined the children 
were neutral regarding a custody determination. (Id. at p. 63.) 
Character and Circumstances. Similarly, the magistrate court concluded that the 
character and circumstances of the parties, pursuant to Idaho Code § 32-717, was "essentially 
neutral." (Id. at p. 67.) The evidence at trial suggested both parents have been involved in the 
children's lives, and both parents could provide an adequate home for the children. (Id.) 
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Children s Interaction and Relationship with Parents and Siblings. Likewise, evidence at 
trial suggested the children interact and have relationships with each of their parents and all of 
their half-siblings and step-siblings. (R Vol. I, p. 112, Hr'g Tr 66: 16-20; Tr Vol. I, p. 224, L. 13-
20; R Vol. I, p. 122, Hr'g Tr 105:1-18.) Further, should Chelsea decide to remain in Blackfoot, 
this factor becomes a non-issue, as the children can continue to interact with their parents and all 
of their siblings. This is another factor that does not satisfy Chelsea's burden in proving 
relocation is in the best interests of the children. 
Children s Adiustment to Home, School, and Community. In its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, the magistrate court incorrectly evaluated the children's adjustment to their 
home, school, and community under Idaho Code § 32-717 by noting, "The children have made a 
good adjustment to their school in Havre." (R Vol. I, p. 67.) This conclusion is contrary to 
testimony by Ms. Griggs, who noted the children were still transitioning to living in Havre. (Tr 
Vol. I, p. 68, L. 9-23.) Further, the children's adjustment to their school in Havre was not the 
consideration before the magistrate court under Idaho Code § 32-717 - rather, because the 
question is whether the children should be relocated from Blackfoot, the magistrate court should 
have instead focused its analysis under Idaho Code § 32-717 on the children's adjustment to their 
home, school, and community in Blackfoot. 
The evidence at trial supports a conclusion that the children were well-adjusted to their 
home, school, and community in Blackfoot. The children were surrounded by extended family 
members in Blackfoot. (Tr Vol. I, p. 46, L 7 -p. 48, L. 11; R Vol. I, p. 100, Hr'g Tr 18:12-18.) 
The children frequently spent time with Zane's parents. (R Vol. I, p. 98, Hr'g Tr 9:12-25; id at p. 
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141, Hr'g Tr 182:4-25.) The children saw their maternal grandfather, the principal of Snake 
River Middle School, every school day. (Tr Vol. I, p. 317, L. 4-8.) The children were well-
adjusted to and familiar with their environment and surroundings in Blackfoot, which weighed 
against relocation with Chelsea to Havre, Montana. 
Need to Promote Continuity and Stability. Finally, the evidence at trial suggested that 
residence in Blackfoot, rather than Havre, Montana, would promote the greatest continuity and 
stability for the children. As noted above, the children have spent the majority of their lifetime in 
Blackfoot, Idaho, surrounded by extended family and friends. Supra. In addition, and again as 
noted above, the children are well-adjusted to their school and community. Supra. Even 
Chelsea's husband, Daniel Sorensen, acknowledged under oath that relocating the children to 
Havre from Blackfoot would not promote stability in the childrens' lives: 
Q. Thank you. And, in fact, what you're proposing to the Court is the exact 
opposite of stability. You're going to pull the girls out of Blackfoot, take them to 
Havre, and bring them back. Isn't that what you're suggesting? 
A. Yes. 
(R Vol. I, p. 133, Hr'g Tr 151:3-9.) 
In determining what custody arrangement would best promote continuity and stability in 
the lives of the children, the magistrate court looked only within the confines of their household: 
"The need to promote continuity and stability in the life of the child argues for the physical 
custody to be with the Plaintiff, in that the children have been living with their mother since birth 
or more than ten years." (R Vol. I, p. 67.) In so concluding, the magistrate court did not address 
the possibility that Chelsea could reside in Blackfoot, and therefore maintain primary physical 
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custody of the children. Further, in addressing the need to promote continuity and stability in the 
children's lives, the magistrate court improperly and narrowly focused its approach on the 
children's household, rather than the broader view articulated by both Ms. Griggs and Mr. Gamer 
regarding promoting continuity and stability for the children: 
Ms. Griggs: 
Q. And what are - what is your opinion? 
A. My opinion is that it is in the best interest of the girls to stay in Blackfoot, 
with both primary - both parents' primary attachments here. 
Q. And why is that? Why is that your opinion? 
A. Well, as I've stated, that's what provides security for the girls. 
When you look at relocation issues or divorce issues, you want to 
minimize loss and maximize relationships. And that's why my opinion is that they 
should stay in Blackfoot, because of the losses that they would have if they go to 
Montana. They lose their extended family. They might lose their community. 
They lose the people they might go to church with. They lose all of that 
continuity, the - and frequent contact with the parent that remains -
(Tr Vol. I, p. 71, L. 25 - p. 72, L. 15.) 
Mr. Garner: 
Q. Okay. All right. Based on all of that, do you have an opinion about what 
the best interest of the children is in this case? What should happen? 
A. I guess I do. I do have an opinion. And, you know, unfortunately, there is 
damage, if you want to call it that, to their social structure. How much damage is 
going to occur developmentally, I don't know. I think, in these types of situations, 
its - you know, it's a guessing game. It's a gamble, regardless of how you pick 
and choose. 
But in order to reduce or minimize damage, the ideal thing in my mind 
would be to restore their previous social structure, their previous environment, as 
much as is possible, which - which, at this point, would be for the - for the 
nuclear family of the -well, I can't call it nuclear family per se, because we're -
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you know, we could be talking biological parents but for their mother and 
stepfather, Chelsea and Dan Sorensen, to live in Blackfoot and carry on the same 
type of level of activity and schedule that they previously have had. 
(Id. at p. 99, L. 24 -p. 100, L. 19.) As demonstrated by this testimony from Ms. Griggs and Mr. 
Garner, considerations on how to best promote continuity and stability in a child's life extends 
beyond the confines of a home. Instead, the evidence indicates that custody of the children in 
Blackfoot would promote more continuity and stability in the children's lives because of 
"familiarity with the area- a 'stable known environment."' Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278,284, 
281 P.3d 115, 121 (2012). 
The custody arrangement established by the magistrate court does not promote continuity 
and stability in the children's lives. As ordered by the magistrate court, the children now travel 
for 15 hours roundtrip once a month to see Zane, an arrangement an expert witness termed 
"detrimental to the children." (R Vol. I, pp. 69-70; Tr Vol. I, p. 115, L. 17 - 21.) The current 
travel schedule requires the children to miss occasional days of school. (Id.) The overwhelming 
weight of expert testimony suggested this level of traveling would be detrimental to the children: 
Ms. Griggs: 
Q. What impacts can traveling have on children in this type of situation? 
A. Well, children really resent traveling. It disrupts their schedule, and they 
end up spending a significant amount of time in a car rather than when - in a visit 
with parents. If - depending on how much time that is, if going to see one parent 
means "I'm in the car for eight hours," that's not fun. And that's disruptive. 
It takes them away from activities they may want to do. It takes them 
away from sports they may want to do. It takes them away from their daily life, 
their friends. 
So it's basically saying "I'm disrupting everything and breaking you away 
from one connection and taking you to another, then give you just long enough to 
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start to re-establish that, then breaking you away from that and taking you back." 
And kids don't like it. It's very hard on them. 
Q. And, in your experience, do kids blame one parent? 
A. Typically, children start to be angry and blame the parent who they see -
who they perceive as the one making them travel, who is usually the one they're 
traveling to see. 
(Tr Vol. I, p. 68, L. 25 p. 69, L. 24.) 
M,: Garner: 
Q. Do you think it's viable to travel that - I mean, how does that affect 
children, if they're traveling that far every other week? You really think that's a 
viable plan, whether they're coming this way or that way or who lives where? 
A. No. I don't believe it's viable for children to travel. It's much easier for 
adults to travel. I mean, we all have heard the - and put up with at least those of 
us that are parents, with the "Are we there yet? Are we there yet?" kind of thing, 
even when it's a good trip. 
But when they are frequent and exhaustive trips, then there is resentment 
fostered towards the whole process -
Q. Right. 
A. and towards the adults that are forcing it upon them. 
(Id. at p. 252, L. 23 - p. 253, L. 14.) 
The evidence presented at trial addressing the factors articulated in Idaho Code § 32-717 
indicate the magistrate court's order that the children stay with Chelsea in Montana was not a 
"very close call." See Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353,361,347 P.3d 645,653 (2015). Instead, 
evidence relating to these factors, taken as a whole, suggest it was in the children's best interest 
to remain in Blackfoot. Chelsea, as the relocating parent, failed to meet her burden in 
demonstrating relocating to Havre, Montana was in the children's best interests, and the 
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magistrate court abused its discretion in sanctioning her unilateral move. 
Impact on Children of Future Second }vfove. In addition to the factors articulated in Idaho 
Code § 32-717, magistrate courts are free to look at other relevant issues when determining child 
custody. Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449, 454, 197 P.3d 310, 315 (2008). In this case, one such 
relevant factor, closely related to the principle of promoting continuity and stability in the 
children's lives, is Chelsea's planned future move back to Blackfoot, a factor which distinguishes 
this case from fact patterns found in other Idaho relocation cases. See generally Lamont v. 
Lamont, 158 Idaho 353,247 P.3d 115 (2015). Chelsea and Daniel Sorensen both testified that 
they plan to move with their family back to the Blackfoot area in a few years, depending on 
Daniel's ability to obtain employment in the area. (R Vol. I, p. 133, Hr'g Tr 150:22-24; id. at p. 
12 1, Hr' g Tr 1 0 1 : 7 -18.) 
Ms. Griggs testified to the inherent difficulties associated with requiring the children to 
first integrate into their community in Havre, Montana, only to then have them attempt to 
reestablish relationships in Blackfoot upon moving back to the area in a few years: 
Q. Can you describe the probable outlook of a transition back to Blackfoot in 
junior high school in three years? 
A. I think it's really concerning. I think that taking the children away and -
during these formative years and helping - and allowing them to establish a whole 
new community, a new school, all of those new relationships, and basically end 
those relationships here for most purposes, especially friend and school purposes, 
and then having them come back at the transitional years of puberty, of 13 and 
junior high, which are the most difficult for girls especially, creates a real 
struggle. 
They're going to have to come back and try and integrate back into 
friendships that they've lost. And it's also really difficult for them to maintain 
those, even with good intentions, because, if the parent that remains has such a 
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short amount of time, they don't want to share that with - let you go to your 
friends' house. And so it's really hard to maintain those friendships, even with 
good intentions. 
(Tr Vol. I, p. 70, L. 4-24.) 
Q. So let me ask you this question: If the only option is for the kids to stay in 
Montana with Mom and Stepdad or switch primary custody to Dad in Blackfoot, 
which would be better for the kids of this age and these circumstances? 
A. I believe it would be for the kids to switch primary custody to Dad and 
have as much visitation and continuity of contact with Mom and they remain in 
Blackfoot. 
Q. And why- and why do you think that? 
A. Because the research supports it, because that's where they're moving 
back to. It prevents multiple transitions. We talked yesterday - I talked yesterday 
about maximizing relationships and minimizing loss. In the situation if they move 
now, they re-establish, they move again, there's multiple losses in that scenario. 
Right now, they have not lost the relationships in Blackfoot. They haven't 
lost their connection to home, school, community, extended family. That hasn't 
been lost. 
And so if we can re get them back here, that won't be a loss. And but if 
they go and re-establish there, there will be more and more distance, that 
represents a loss, loss ofrelationship. And then they'll lose again when they have 
to move back, and they'll have to do it all over again. 
And so I believe them staying in Blackfoot is in their best interest. 
(Id. at p. 240, L. IO p. 241, L. 13.) 
Despite this extensive testimony regarding the detrimental effects a second future move 
would have on the children, the magistrate court determined it was in the children's best interests 
to remain in Chelsea's primary physical custody in Havre, Montana. This was an abuse of 
discretion, given the weight of the evidence addressing the potential social and emotional 
upheaval the children face in moving a second time, compared to the alternative of keeping the 
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children in Blackfoot. 
Chelsea did not meet her burden, as the relocating parent, to prove a relocation to Havre, 
Montana, was in the children's best interests. Again, it was not "a very close call." Instead, the 
evidence at trial, including applicable expert witness testimony, skewed in favor of the children 
residing in Blackfoot. Because Chelsea failed to meet her burden, the magistrate court abused its 
discretion when, after analysis of the factors articulated in Idaho Code § 32-717, and in spite of 
overwhelming expert testimony to the contrary, it determined it was in the children's best interest 
to be uprooted from their environment in Blackfoot and relocated to Havre, Montana. 
2. The magistrate court improperly considered Chelsea's position over the 
best interests of the children. 
Despite the overwhelming evidence indicating it was in the children's best interests to 
remain in Blackfoot, the magistrate court determined the children should stay with Chelsea and 
be allowed to move to Havre, Montana. (R Vol. I, p. 69.) In so concluding, the magistrate court 
abused its discretion to determine what was in the children's best interests by instead making 
concessions for Chelsea's unilateral decision to move to Montana. 
A magistrate court determines custody based on what is in the child's or children's best 
interests. Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278,283,281 P.3d 115, 120 (2012) (citing Schultz v. Schultz, 
145 Idaho 859, 862, 187 P.3d 1234, 1237 (2008). A magistrate court does not award custody 
based on the parents' preferences or wishes. Clair, 153 Idaho at 286, 281P.3d at 123 ("Granted, 
the separation was not easy for Tracy, but this does not mean that the magistrate court is required 
to consider Tracy's interests above the best interests of [the child]."). 
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As noted above, the evidence at trial suggested that it was in the children's best interests 
to continue to reside in Blackfoot instead of moving to Havre, Montana, only to then move back 
to Blackfoot in a few years' time. See supra. Additional expert witness testimony suggested it 
was unfair to lay the burden of Chelsea's unilateral move to Montana on the children: 
Q. What, under that circumstance, then do you think the parents should do -
Mom and Dad? 
A. Well, based on the transcripts that I read, Mom has been the primary 
custodial parent for all of their lives. And I believe that should remain, if that's 
here in Blackfoot. I believe the children don't need to be disrupted from that. 
Unfortunately, in this case, adults have made decisions that affect children 
greatly. And I believe both options of them staying here with a change of primary 
custody and a move there, disruption of custody or visitation with Dad are both 
disruptive, like the Court said. 
And so I believe what's in the best interest of the children is to stay in 
Blackfoot, maintain primary custody with Mom, and resume what was already set 
in place from the beginning. That's what's known. 
And that the people - the adults should bear the burden of the travel. The 
adults should bear the burden of the decisions that have been made, not the 
children, especially given the fact that, in three years, they're going to come back, 
and then the children will bear that burden again. 
The adults won't be the ones trying to integrate back into school and into 
friendships. The adults won't be the ones trying to re-establish those connections. 
Because adults are much better suited to manage that on their own, and 
kides aren't. And so it puts a significant burden on these children to disrupt them 
that way and then bring them back. 
(Tr Vol. I, p. 72, L. 25 -p. 74, L. 5.) 
In addition, further evidence at trial suggested that a custody order requiring the children 
to reside in Blackfoot would not "pose a substantial hardship" to Chelsea, as was the case with a 
relocating mother in Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353, 360, 34 7 P.3d 645, 652 (2015). In 
Lamont, the mother, a single parent, sought to relocate from Salmon, Idaho to Meridian, Idaho, 
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for a new job. Id, 158 Idaho at 358-59, 347 P.3d at 650-51. The mother presented evidence that 
"because of negative job factors in Salmon," including the likelihood that she would lose her job 
with the Salmon School District, it was in the best interests of the children that she be permitted 
to relocate with them to Meridian. Id. The magistrate court, in what the Idaho Supreme Court 
termed "a very close call," determined that Salmon's economically depressed status would result 
in a "substantial hardship" if the mother were not permitted to relocate to Meridian with the 
children. Id., 158 Idaho at 360-361, 347 P.3d at 653-54. 
Unlike the mother in Lamont, the evidence at trial indicated Chelsea would not suffer a 
"substantial hardship" if the children were to remain in Blackfoot. Chelsea had the means 
available to either reside in Blackfoot, and thereby retain primary physical custody of the 
children, or to travel to Blackfoot on weekends to visit the children. Chelsea's father, Dean 
Bonney, testified that Chelsea and the children would "absolutely" be welcome at his home in 
Blackfoot. (Tr Vol. I, p. 313, L. 10-23.) Mr. Bonney also testified that he and other family 
members would be available to help Chelsea, as necessary. (Id. at p. 313, L. 24- p. 314, L. 18.) 
Zane's mother, Karen Reed, testified at the hearing on temporary orders that she was also willing 
and able to provide help in caring for the children. (R Vol. I, p. 141, Hr'g Tr 182:4-25.) 
While Chelsea conveyed her desire to move to Havre, Montana, with her husband, it 
remains that Chelsea's interests should not have factored into the magistrate court's decision. 
Chelsea unilaterally decided to move to Havre, Montana, and while the magistrate court cannot 
order Chelsea to live in Blackfoot, it also cannot base its determination of the children's best 
interests on her unilateral decision to relocate. Clair, 153 Idaho at 285, 281 P.3d at 122. 
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Instead, the magistrate court should have considered only what was in the best interests 
of the children, irrespective of Chelsea's decision to move to Montana. Given the overwhelming 
evidence that it was in the children's best interests to remain in Blackfoot, the magistrate court 
should have ordered a custody arrangement that would meet that objective. Instead, the 
magistrate court abused its discretion in determining that the children would move to Havre, 
Montana, to remain in Chelsea's primary physical custody. 
F. The magistrate court abused its discretion in improperly considering the tender 
years doctrine in issuing its decision. 
The tender years doctrine, which calls for a child of "tender years" to be cared for by his 
or her mother, rather than by his or her father, was a frequently cited factor in child custody 
decisions dating from more than a half century ago: 
It is the established rule of this court, and other courts as well, that, all other 
considerations being equal, a child of tender age or a girl of even more mature 
years can and will be reared, trained and cared for best by its mother. This 
conclusion needs no argument to support it because it arises out of the very nature 
and instincts of motherhood; nature has ordained it. 
Kriegerv. Krieger, 59 Idaho 301, _, 81 P.2d 1081, 1083 (1938). 
Today, almost 80 years after publication of the Krieger opinion, the tender years doctrine 
"has limited impact in Idaho law. To the extent previous case law exists which suggests a 
preference for the mother as custodian of a child of tender years, the preference exists only when 
all other considerations are equal." Moye v. Moye, 102 Idaho 170, 172-73, 627 P.2d 799, 801-02 
(1981) (citing Prescott v. Prescott, 97 Idaho 257,261, 542 P.2d 1176, 1180 (1975)). The tender 
years doctrine only comes into consideration in situations wherein all other factors in the child 
Appellant Brief 42 
custody determination weigh in favor of each parent equally. Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278, 283, 
281 P.3d 115, 120 (2012) (citing Moye, 102 Idaho at 172-73, 627 P.2d at 801-02). 
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the magistrate court noted: 
The Court has also considered the ages of the children. As they enter their pre-
teen years, the issues of maturation are important. Having a stay at home mother 
is an important consideration for the court. 
(R Vol. I, p. 68.) While the magistrate court did not explicitly reference the "tender years" 
doctrine in the above language, the court's reference to Chelsea's status as a "stay at home 
mother" and the children's "issues of maturation" indicates the magistrate court considered the 
tender years doctrine in concluding it was in the children's best interests to remain in Montana 
with Chelsea rather than return to Blackfoot with Zane. 
The magistrate court's consideration of the tender years doctrine was an abuse of 
discretion. As noted in the Clair opinion, and indeed in all case law addressing the tender years 
doctrine, a trial court only considers the tender year doctrine if all other factors in the child 
custody proceeding weigh equally in favor of either parent. Such a situation did not exist in this 
case, however. (See Tr Vol. I, p. 397, L. 9-17.) As noted above, the evidence at trial, including 
both testimony from fact witnesses and testimony from expert witnesses, indicated it is in the 
children's best interests to remain in Blackfoot, where they could maintain frequent, continuing 
contact with both parents, assuming Chelsea so chose, while remaining surrounded by familiar 
extended family, friends, and classmates, without the added stress and trauma associated with 
another move in the near future. See supra. 
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Because the evidence suggests it is in the children's best interests to stay in Idaho, 
whether in Chelsea's primary custody or in Zane's primary custody, the magistrate court should 
not have considered the tender years doctrine in making its determination. The tender years 
doctrine analysis had no justification in these proceedings, and the magistrate court's 
determination that the children would be best cared for by a stay at home mother was 
inappropriate and an abuse of discretion. 
G. Zane should be awarded his attorney fees on appeal. 
Zane requests that the Court order that its attorney fees be awardable by the magistrate 
court in the event that Zane is deemed to be the overall prevailing party. See Eighteen Mile 
Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 720-21, 117 P.3d 130, 134-35 
(2005); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54(d) & (e) (2016); IDAHO APP. R. 41 (2016); IDAHO CODE§ 12-120 
(2016); IDAHO CODE § 12-121 (2016). 
V. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED 
As a result of the foregoing, the magistrate court should be reversed and an order be 
entered ordering Chelsea to immediately return to Blackfoot with the children, or, in the 
alternative, transferring primary physical custody of the custody to Zane. 
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Dated: June 15, 2016. 
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